Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 61

Issue 1

Article 5

2010

Professor Shanker
Wilbur C. Leatherberry

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wilbur C. Leatherberry, Professor Shanker, 61 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 7 (2010)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol61/iss1/5

This Tribute is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

12/30/2010 1:36:40 PM

PROFESSOR SHANKER
Wilbur C. Leatherberry†
When I joined the faculty in 1973, all my colleagues called
Professor Shanker ―Morry.‖ It took a while for me to get used to
doing that because I was his student in four commercial law classes.
He remained Professor Shanker—the one who talked about ―the
majority view, the minority view, and the Shanker view.‖ As
students, we knew that the Shanker view would be important on the
exam. We also came to see that the Shanker view was always wellsupported and very often should have been the dominant view with
respect to commercial law issues.
Morry began teaching in 1961 as the Uniform Commercial Code
(―UCC‖ or the ―Code‖) was sweeping the country. It was enacted in
Ohio in 1962. Morry had several years of commercial law practice
experience dealing with the jumble of statutes and case law that the
UCC was designed to supplant. In my commercial law classes in
1966–68, we read cases decided under the old law (since there were
so few UCC decisions that entered the casebooks in those years) and
attempted to apply the new code to those fact patterns. Morry was an
enthusiastic and energetic advocate of the change wrought by the
UCC. He spoke with admiration about the drafters, especially Karl
Llewelyn and Grant Gilmore and gave us an appreciation of what a
great achievement the Code was. He also pointed out the many
drafting problems and made us think carefully about how courts
should construe the ambiguities and fill the gaps in the text.
As one who saw the benefits of the change wrought by Article 2,
Morry wrote an article about the parallel development of strict tort
products liability.1 He argued that individuals could be compensated
†
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appropriately within the parameters of Article 2 for personal injuries
caused by defective products. What the strict tort proponents saw as
barriers to effective compensation could have been dealt with by
courts applying Article 2 and by a few sensible amendments. What he
considered unintended consequences of strict tort—elimination of any
possibility of reducing the price of goods in exchange for a limitation
of liability, for example—would have been avoided if Article 2 had
been permitted to control the product liability field instead of strict
tort.2 He may well have been right, but the dominant wave was led by
Prosser, Traynor, and Wade and strict tort captured the field.
Although strict tort did not completely eclipse the field, as Morry had
first feared, it created some confusion for practicing lawyers and
fodder for academics. In Morry’s words from an article he published
in 1979:
Strict tort has brought about substantively little, if anything,
which was not available under the Uniform Commercial
Code. It has given legal scholars the opportunity to discuss
the interrelationship between the Commercial Code and strict
tort ―with all the zeal, fury, and abstruseness of medieval
theologians . . . .‖ But, for those who must live with these
competing products liability systems and their different
labels, it seems only to have brought about an enervating,
costly, and confusing word game which hardly was worth the
effort.3
Morry was not a conservative generally opposed to change—he
eagerly embraced the major reform the Code imposed on the
commercial law field. He did oppose change for the sake of change,
however. For example, he saw no reason for adoption of the major
revision in Article 2 that was drafted by Professor Richard Speidel but
never promulgated by the Commissioners because of vigorous
opposition by both business and consumer interests. That draft
changed virtually every section, inserted additional sections, and
renumbered the sections. Many of the changes (like eliminating
masculine pronouns) were matters of form rather than substance. Any
change in statutory text risks creating ambiguity where none existed
or inadvertently changing substance and producing unintended
consequences. Fortunately, that draft died and a later, much less
Id. at 39–47.
Morris G. Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser’s Products Liability Crossword Game:
The Strict or Stricter Liability of Commercial Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
550, 575–76 (1979) (citation omitted).
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ambitious revision appears to have died as well. The drafters created a
flexible statute that was intended to be adapted and augmented by
judicial decision and Morry firmly believed in that.
Morry was sometimes frustrated to see that judges—and
lawyers—did not always understand legal rules or the underlying
policies and purposes. For example, he wrote an article about an Ohio
case in which the Supreme Court confused the Statute of Frauds and
the parol evidence rule.4 In the article he was very critical of the
court’s opinion but he expressed some regret that he was so hard on
the judges when it was likely that the lawyers had done a poor job of
presenting and explaining the issues.
Morry contributed an article to our law review providing a
thorough Shanker-view analysis of the application of UCC 2-708(2).5
He argued for strict interpretation of the statutory language that other
commentators were ignoring in order to justify awarding damages to
the lost-volume seller. He argued that, in the real world, few if any
sellers were likely to suffer losses relating to a reduction in the
number of units sold when a buyer breaches. In the event of a breach
by the buyer, the seller who could resell the goods would lose nothing
more than the difference between the contract price and the resale
price, plus incidental expenses relating to the resale. In his view, that
remedy was the only one the Code provided—and wisely so. Other
commentators and courts believed that, at least in some cases, the
seller lost volume, meaning that he sold one less unit than he
otherwise would have sold. They construed UCC 2-708(2) to allow
that seller to recover his profit plus the overhead applicable to that
lost sale.
The same issue of the law review included an excellent student
note providing an economic analysis of the lost-volume argument.6
That piece was early in the wave of economic analyses of legal issues.
It applied microeconomic theory and concluded that Morry was right
to be skeptical about the likelihood that a seller would actually lose
volume in the event of a buyer’s breach. The piece also demonstrated
that calculation of the appropriate damage award was considerably
more complex and difficult than it appeared to be. The two pieces

4 Morris G. Shanker, Judicial Misuses of the Word Fraud to Defeat the Parol Evidence
Rule and the Statute of Frauds (With Some Cheers and Jeers for the Ohio Supreme Court), 23
AKRON L. REV. 1 (1989).
5 Morris G. Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of UCC Section 2-708(2) (One
Profit for the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 697 (1973).
6 Comment, A Theoretical Postscript: Microeconomics and the Lost-Volume Seller, 24
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 712 (1973).
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were often cited together in discussions about the lost-volume-seller
problem.7
Morry must be our longest-serving faculty member. It is hard to
imagine his 49 years of service being exceeded by anyone. He
strongly influenced the thinking and the approach to legal issues of a
huge number of students. In class, he was demanding but never
unkind. He insisted on class preparation and called on students who
returned to class after unexcused absences. He did not just accept a
student’s statement that he was unprepared. Instead, he sometimes
used an unprepared student as a blank slate with respect to issues
treated by the Code section being considered. I recall being a truly
blank slate on at least one occasion. He gave me credit for stating
principles that would be right under the common law while pointing
out that, had I read the Code section, I would have known that the
Code rule was different.
When I began teaching Contracts and, later, Sales, Morry was
generous about discussing issues, but not overbearing or controlling
about how I chose to handle the courses. He always provided me a
copy of his teaching materials and clearly hoped I would use them,
but I never did. I knew from his classes that I could not teach the
courses his way. I lacked his practice experience and his depth of
understanding of the history that underlays the Code, especially
Articles 2 and 9.
He taught Article 9 in a course called ―Property Security,‖ which
included materials on real estate mortgages. He was convinced that
familiarity with real estate mortgage law would help students
understand personal property security issues in Article 9. When he
gave up teaching that course after the major revision of Article 9
(including addition of a number of sections and major reorganization,
including renumbering), he urged me to teach an Article 9 course. He
accepted the fact that I was not prepared to teach material about real
estate mortgages, but assumed that, because I had been well taught
with respect to the Code, I could do the job on Article 9.
Morry was a very supportive faculty colleague, but was not
reluctant to argue against what he regarded as proliferation of courses
that distracted students from the core courses—like commercial law
courses. He remained steadfast in his conviction that our principal
obligation is to prepare lawyers for the real world of law practice.
Morry was a teacher and a scholar. His one foray into
administration was a semester spent as acting dean after Lou Toepfer
7 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits
Puzzle, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1155, 1158 n.13 (1990).
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left the deanship to become president of the university. Morry did not
enjoy that role and quickly returned to his faculty position. He was
never fond of meetings and was quick to supply a motion to adjourn
as faculty meetings came to a close. Others will now make that
motion, but Morry set a standard of excellence and dedication for this
school and for legal education that will rarely, if ever, be exceeded.

